President Has Bold, New Plans for Homeless and At-Risk Families

February 16, 2016

The Obama administration has turned its attention to family homelessness — a big problem even now, years after the recession officially ended. We find the focus in the President’s proposed budget — and not only in the groundbreaking investment the White House overview flags.

We could, of course, find it in all sorts of places, especially if we took a long-range view. We see, for example, diverse investments that will enable current and future workers to qualify for higher paying jobs.

But I’ll confine myself here to a handful of proposals that would house homeless families and prevent some from losing their homes. A partial summary even so.

Assistance for Homeless Families

The proposed budget would dedicate $11 billion over 10 years to housing assistance earmarked for homeless families. An estimated 80% would fund Housing Choice vouchers — those that families can generally have so long as their incomes don’t rise above 30% of the median for the area they live in.

The other 20% would support rapid re-housing, which generally subsidizes housing for a year or less, plus services intended to enable families to then pay the full costs.

The budget for the upcoming year would essentially make a down payment, providing funds for 10,000 new vouchers for families with children and 8,000 more units to rapidly re-house others.

An interesting policy shift here, since the federal Interagency Council on Homelessness has tilted toward rapid re-housing as the tool for ending family homelessness.

We can, I think, credit the shift to the findings of a recently-completed study conducted for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The White House summary, in fact, suggests as much.

Shift in Budget Too

The homeless family piece of the proposed budget is notable for another reason. The $11 billion would be so-called mandatory spending. In other words, the federal government would have the authority to make the investment unless Congress changed or repealed it.

Up to this point, homeless assistance, vouchers and other such programs have depended on discretionary spending, i.e., the choices Congress annually makes. This would still be true for the down payment.

But the larger shift to the mandatory side will permit further investments without effectively taking funds from other non-defense programs, as they would if they added to discretionary spending, which the Budget Control Act caps.

Though subsequent deals temporarily eased the caps, public housing authorities are still shy roughly 67,000 housing vouchers lost due to the across-the-board cuts the BCA required for 2013.

Mandatory funding at the proposed level would provide 20,000 new vouchers a year, a HUD director told those of us on a budget briefing call. The Secretary put the total number of families housed at 550,000 during an in-person briefing.

And they’d be secure from the vagaries of annual spending choices.

Short-Shot Homelessness Prevention

Not all families need ongoing assistance to cover their housing costs, of course. Some can remain housed if they merely get a swift infusion of cash or the equivalent — enough, for example, to repair a car needed to get to work or to defray lost wages when an injury sidelines the breadwinner.

The President proposes $2 billion for grants to test ways of providing emergency aid and services. This too is a sort of down payment because the aim is to learn what works best — and so pave the way for a future initiative.

This isn’t the only preventive measure the President proposes. We find also two for insurance. One would tackle state restrictions on unemployment insurance benefits that left barely more than a quarter of laid-off workers with any wage replacement in 2014.

The other measure would create a wage insurance program for workers who lose their jobs and have to settle for one paying less. They’d get half the wages they lost for two years, though no more than $10,000 total. Still, a bit of a cushion for families while they try to adjust.

More Hope Than Change?

Republican House leaders bashed the proposed budget before they even saw it. “[A] progressive manual for growing the federal government at the expense of hardworking Americans,” Speaker Paul Ryan opined.

That doesn’t mean it’s altogether irrelevant, however. For one thing, it presents reasonable solutions to problems that affect hardworking Americans, as well as those who can’t work — homeless children, for example.

How many of them is anybody’s guess. We do know, however, that the latest reported one-night count found nearly 128,000 who met HUD’s restrictive definition of “homeless.” That’s a lot of kids to shrug off as just cost items in a left-wing agenda.

The proposed budget is also relevant because its homeless family initiatives — and many others that would benefit lower-income people — don’t drive up the deficit. On the contrary. The projected deficit would drop by $2.9 trillion over the next 10 years.

I can’t account specifically for the budget changes that would pay for the President’s initiatives. I do note, however, a suite of tax reforms that would raise more revenues from corporations and well-off individuals.

Doubt Congressional Republicans will accept the pay-fors to give homeless families a modicum of security — or in other ways, help poor and near-poor people, as the President proposes.

But the offsets show what’s possible within tight fiscal constraints. And they could be back on the table, a hopeful budget expert has suggested. A lotta hope there. but who knows?

Better to let hope fuel our efforts, as it has at the White House, than to leave change to “the worst,” who surely are “full of passionate intensity” these days.

UPDATE: Due to a typographical error, this post originally understated the estimated number of families that would have housing vouchers. I have corrected the figure.

 


When Personal Responsibility Paves the Way to Homelessness

January 21, 2016

Many accounts of homelessness focus on personal financial crises — a job loss, for example, a serious illness or injury that results in huge medical bills, an eruption of domestic violence that impels a spouse or partner to flee the breadwinner.

Others cite less sudden crises due to mental illness and/or substance abuse, both ultimately leading to lack of money for housing. Still others take a different tack — rising housing costs, with no commensurate wage increases to cover them.

But sometimes families become homeless for altogether other reasons. Here’s a still-unfinished true story and some untruths it exposes.

I’ve written before about Peter,* who does occasional work for me. Now he and his daughters are homeless, though not (yet) eligible for federally-funded assistance as such.

Peter must depend on earnings from short-term jobs with flexible hours because he often must drop everything to tend to his chronically ill younger daughter. But between what he makes and her Supplemental Security Income benefits, he’s had enough to cover the family’s housing costs.

Seems his landlord didn’t have enough for the mortgage payments, however. So the lender repossessed the building and evicted the tenants.

Shortly before and after, a series of untoward events diminished Peter’s earnings and, at the same time, forced him to come up with extra money. His daughter’s new medication caused drastic side-effects. So he had to stay home with her for some days.

Then his car got towed because he’d parked it illegally, seeing no other way he could sell the newspapers he’d already purchased, as all vendors of our local homelessness paper do. No way for Peter to get to other jobs unless he paid the fine and the hefty towing-storage fee.

His sister then borrowed the car and got arrested for drunk driving. Immediately thrown in jail because it was her second such offense. Peter felt he had to bail her out, which, of course, meant a fee to a bail bondsman. And he had to bail the car out too because the authorities had impounded it.

Now, none of these things or even all in combination would have left Peter with nothing to spend except what he could earn day by day if he’d had the emergency savings that financial experts advise. But he could just get by when everything went smoothly.

So at this point, he, his daughters and his sister are holed up in a cheap motel while he waits for the tax refund that will cover the upfront costs of a new apartment lease — or so he hopes.

He’s thus far found no apartment he can afford. In the family’s home county, a two-bedroom apartment — very snug for them — costs, on average, $1,625 a month. And he sure won’t get help from the local housing authority. He’s been on its waiting list for some considerable time.

As I put together the pieces of this story, I recalled part of Tolstoy’s frame for Anna Karenina. “[E]ach unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” But the story has other, more pertinent lessons.

Right-wing policymakers and the gurus they listen to often trace poverty to a failure of personal responsibility. Well, who exercises more personal responsibility than Peter, who could have left his daughters with their egregiously negligent mother — and his sister miserable in jail and then alone to struggle against her alcoholism?

More specifically, the Republican Presidential candidates at the recent “expanding opportunity” forum seemingly concurred on three ways our public policies and programs could reduce poverty.

First, they have to do a better job of promoting marriage — not only of getting people (of opposite sexes) to marry, but of inducing them to stay married and in the same home. Hard to see how persisting in a failed marriage to a persistent substance abuser would have made life better for Peter and his kids.

Second, public policies have to get people working for enough pay so they can support themselves and their dependents. Peter could do that if his younger daughter had neither a chronic illness nor developmental disabilities. He has in-demand technical skills and an entrepreneurial spirit.

As things stand now, however, he can’t responsibly delegate care for the daughter to a home healthcare aide or anyone else. Too many emergencies. Too many judgment calls only a parent can make. And too much time needed for his role in the education she’s receiving to develop independent living skills.

Third, our major federal safety net programs should get rolled into block grants that states can spend pretty much however they see fit. I’ll leave it to Center on Budget and Policy Priorities President Robert Greenstein to explain (again) why this is such a bad idea.

I’ll merely note that the programs Jeb Bush, Marco Rubio and forum moderator Paul Ryan would replace with super-block grants expressly include major federal housing assistance programs.

If Peter’s got problems getting back into an affordable apartment now, imagine how he and his family would fare if states had no obligation to provide vouchers or public housing — and had less in real dollars to fund any of the block-granted programs that now serve low-income people’s needs.

And imagine what would happen if he couldn’t rely on Medicaid for the services that keep his daughter alive — a distinct possibility if the program were block-granted, as Ryan and his House Republican colleagues intend.

* As before, I’ve changed his name to protect his and his family’s privacy.


A Better Winter Plan for Homeless DC Families … At Last

September 10, 2015

I’ve remarked before on promising shifts in the District of Columbia’s approach to homelessness generally and to family homelessness in particular. We see them again, I think, in the Winter Plan the DC Interagency Council on Homelessness adopted last Tuesday.

‘Bout time because we’ve witnessed a series of funding cutbacks — and worse — by the past two administrations. Some, though not all surfaced, if you knew what to look for, in the annual plans the ICH developed, as legally required, to lay the groundwork for what the District would do to keep homeless people safe during severely-cold weather.

I’ve been blogging on the plans for six years now — mainly on how they address the District’s legal responsibility to shelter or otherwise protect homeless families from freezing outdoors.

Last year’s plan for families was, in most respects, the worst. An effort initiated the prior year to estimate shelter needs on a month-to-month basis was abandoned — or shared only among the drafters.

No specifics at all for how the District would shelter or house the estimated total number of families who’d be entitled to protection during the five or so months of the winter season.

As I wrote at the time, the ICH basically threw up its hands because the homeless services budget clearly fell short of the resources needed.

The new plan doesn’t — and perhaps couldn’t — specify the number of families that won’t need shelter because help they receive kept them housed or will need it only for a short while because they get subsidized housing of one sort or another.

It does, however, make a serious effort to project shelter needs for each winter month — a more sophisticated projection than the plan for 2013-14 disclosed.

We see, on the one hand, the number of families that will qualify for shelter and, on the other hand, the number that will “exit” — not only those who’ll leave because they find some alternative, as before, but also those who receive assistance.

This may sound like a technical matter, but it isn’t because the estimates provide the basis for monitoring the in-and-out flow — and thus for action, if needed, to avert another crisis. The plan, in fact, commits the District to updating the figures.

Three other changes reflect policy shifts — all embedded in the estimates. One is the Bowser administration’s decision to shelter homeless families who’ve got no safe place to stay year round, rather than let them in only when the law says it must.

This is something that advocates have urged, for both humane and practical reasons, ever since the Department of Human Services, under the Gray administration, abandoned an unofficial, but operative year-round shelter policy dating back to some time before the Homeless Services Reform Act established a right to shelter.

The humane aspect needs no explanation. The practical, however, perhaps does. Basically, the intake center was overwhelmed with homeless families on the first freezing-cold day — and DC General, the main homeless family shelter, immediately full, if it wasn’t already.

This is one, though not the only reason that DHS had to scramble to find a place to park homeless families. Also why intake center staff may not have done the best job with needs assessments and referrals, the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless has suggested.

The two other changes reflect a budget that realistically anticipates the need to shelter more families than DC General can accommodate.

Would seem like a no-brainer, one might think. But the last Gray administration budget included no funds for motel rooms, even though it also left roughly 90 DC General units unfunded. This, more than anything else, accounts for the no-plan Winter Plan for homeless families last year.

Now we have not only projections for “overflow units needed,” but a subset for “contingency capacity.” This, I’m told, provides for an extra number of motel rooms DHS will contract for to ensure swift, adequate shelter if the entry estimates prove too low or the exit estimates too high.

The numbers can, of course, be adjusted as the season goes on. But the very fact that the plan expressly includes a fudge factor indicates that DHS has both the will and some confidence in resources to agree to a crisis prevention measure.

Here again, I’m struck by the difference that the Mayor has made by her choice of a new director and inferentially her commitment to support. Looking back even before the later days of the Gray administration, we see instead empty assurances that DHS will somehow muddle through.

Finally, I’d be remiss if I didn’t note that the DC Council also deserves credit for policies and plans that promise more enlightened, effective services for both homeless families and singles.

The ICH has long had members with the expertise and commitment to propose such policies and plans. But the Council’s decision to create what became a funded executive director position for the ICH has clearly made a difference.

I’ve already commented on the thoughtful, ambitious plan the ICH developed to make homelessness in the District “rare, brief, and non-recurring.” The budget for the upcoming fiscal year shows that the Mayor intends to jump start action on the plan.

So we’ve got grounds to hope for more effective homeless services, better tuned to the diverse needs of homeless and at-risk residents — a prospectively fewer of them, though that hinges on developments beyond the reach of DHS.

I feel similarly hopeful about the new Winter Plan — and for similar reasons.  As I learned early on, non-agency members of the ICH working group that develops the annual plans may propose, but it’s DHS that disposes so far as resources are concerned.

Not saying everything will fall nicely into place now. But the Winter Plan, so far as it goes, does seem to  reflect the “fresh start for homeless families” that the Mayor promised the ICH last Tuesday.

NOTE: Not everything the Mayor told the ICH merits as much confidence. I’ll probably have more to say about her legislative plans when I’ve got a clearer fix on them.


Housing Vouchers Best Solution for Family Homelessness

July 30, 2015

Here in the District of Columbia — and elsewhere — we’ve had a lot of back-and-forth on rapid re-housing as a tool for ending homelessness. No one doubts that it ends homelessness for awhile, since participants get a short-term subsidy to help cover rent.

The issue is rather whether they can get their act together to the point they can pay full rent when their subsidies expire — generally, at the end of a year, though in some communities up to 18 months.

A study for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development suggests families often can’t — at least, not for very long.

The study was one of those controlled experiments. Researchers gave homeless families in twelve communities one of three types of housing assistance that moved them out of shelters. A fourth group got only the “usual care” the community offered, e.g., more time in the shelter, some supportive services.

Which form of assistance families got, if any had nothing to do with their past history or other characteristics that could affect their near-term prospects, e.g., parental employment, health.

The researchers then looked at how they were faring a year and a half later. Forty-seven percent of the rapidly re-housed reported they’d recently been homeless or living doubled up with friends or family members because they couldn’t afford rent on their own.

This is statistically no different from what families who’d gotten no housing aid reported. By contrast, only 22% of families who’d gotten regular indefinite-term housing vouchers had again been without a home of their own.

So in the simplest sense, the study, which is still ongoing, confirms what most advocates have long said. The best solution for family homelessness is affordable housing. Most wouldn’t be homeless if they just had enough help to pay rent.

Families may also benefit from services, but they generally don’t need what the researchers term “specialized homeless-specific psychosocial services” — an underlying assumption of at least some “usual care” and transitional housing programs.

The study, however, tells us more than this. Families secure in their housing because their vouchers didn’t have fixed end dates fared better on a range of well-being measures.

For example:

  • Fewer children in the securely-housed families had been placed in foster care or sent to live with a relative.
  • Fewer parents reported psychological distress or showed measurable signs of substance abuse.
  • Half as many experienced violence by an “intimate partner,” presumably what most of us refer to as domestic violence.
  • Fewer families suffered from food insecurity, i.e., couldn’t always afford enough for everyone to eat enough (or perhaps anything).

Turning — as of course, one must — to cost issues, we learn that housing vouchers were cheaper than either rapid re-housing or transitional housing.

These are direct costs only. Families with housing vouchers cost, on average, a tad more than those in rapid re-housing once the services they received because they sought them out are factored in — roughly $136.50 more per month.

Emergency shelter, plus “usual care” services cost far more. And interestingly, the services accounted for 63% of the total. Not a great ROI on that investment, it seems.

The president of the National Alliance to End Homelessness says it’s misleading to compare voucher costs to those of “crisis interventions.” This seems reasonable on its face because voucher costs were — and will be — ongoing.

And it’s just the sort of thing one would expect from the head of an organization that’s heavily invested in promoting rapid re-housing. But rapid re-housing has been sold as an effective strategy for ending homelessness, not a short-term solution, as she now says.

Followers may recall questions I raised about the rapid re-housing success rate that the District’s prime homeless services contractor reported — and the former head of the Department of Human Services cited.

That rate reflected only the percent of rapidly re-housed families that hadn’t again sought shelter through the District’s intake system, as Marta Berensin and other attorneys at the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless have noted.

Most other reported success rates have a similar limit.

Things look quite different when we factor in families who started couch-surfing when their short-term housing subsidies expired — and others who became homeless, but didn’t return to the “system” that had failed to solve their problem before.

The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness and the District’s local equivalent envision a time when homelessness will be “rare, brief and non-recurring.” For some families, rapid re-housing may, by this definition, end homelessness.

But for most, subsidies that make housing affordable for the long term seem the answer — at least, among the options the HUD study assessed. Other measures to rebuild and preserve the dwindling stock of affordable housing belong in the mix too.

Because high housing costs, plus low wages and even lower publicly-funded benefits are the main problem, not personal “psychosocial” problems that need fixing.


What DC Could Do About the Homeless Family Crisis

February 12, 2014

As I said a couple of days ago, the District’s homeless family crisis has reached an unprecedented — and unforeseen — level. At the end of last month, the Department of Human Services was already sheltering about 100 more newly homeless families than were projected for the entire winter season.

DHS Director David Berns seems resigned to some sort of cataclysm. “I don’t see how we can continue at this rate,” he said during the recent hearing on the crisis — but also that he didn’t have “any fresh ideas.”

Some movers and shakers on the Interagency Council on Homelessness do have fresh ideas — mainly for how DHS could do what it’s been trying to do better. They’ve produced a multi-part strategy to address the crisis. It also identifies issues that must be swiftly resolved to prevent a recurrence.

The first part consists of immediate measures to speed up the rapid re-housing placement rate, e.g., more staff and other resources to identify and inspect affordable units, perhaps some sort of incentive for landlords so they’ll rent to families with short-term, iffy housing subsidies.

A second part identifies existing homelessness prevention and subsidized housing programs that should receive more funding so as to open up space in the DC General shelter for homeless families and thus reduce — or altogether eliminate — the use of hotels as a fallback.

Roughly 80% of the families would receive rapid re-housing subsidies, plus “help in identifying a longer-term affordable unit” and services “related to housing stability” and employment.

Permanent supportive housing would be made available to about 10%. The remaining 10% or so would receive emergency rental assistance, i.e., one-time help with a security deposit and first month’s rent, plus again help finding an affordable unit.

The percent allocations are based on results of assessments that two of the service providers have been conducting, using a research-based tool designed to match homeless families to the most appropriate types of aid.

Only 15% of the families thus far assessed have sought homeless services in the District again after a term in rapid re-housing, according to testimony by the Community of Hope’s Executive Director Kelly Sweeney McShane.

The Transitional Housing Corporation, which is also using the tool for assessments, has posted similar results for its rapid re-housing program.

I still can’t help wondering how a much larger number of homeless families will manage to pick up the rent — and keep paying it — or find a longer-term affordable unit when their subsidies expire, even if someone’s scouting the market for them.

So it’s good to note that the strategy also calls for a “community conversation” about the Local Rent Supplement Program, i.e., the District’s own version of federally-funded housing vouchers.

As Marta Berensin at the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless observed in her testimony, the District has, for some years, ignored the recommendations of the original Comprehensive Housing Strategy Task Force.

These included 14,600 locally-funded housing vouchers by the beginning of the next decade. The current budget will support about 2,730.

We know the Gray administration doesn’t like these vouchers — at least, not those that enable low-income residents to pay market-rate rents. And both Berns and at least some members of the strategy-development group worry that homeless families will hunker down in shelter if they think they’ll eventually get one.

But if we really want to solve the homeless family crisis, I think the so-called tenant-based vouchers have to be part of the toolbox too. The strategy drafters may agree, since they acknowledge the need for vouchers and other “affordable housing supports.”

We’re also to engage in conversation about other matters, including a return to year round services for homeless families. This is now being framed as a preventive strategy, though basic human decency alone could justify it.

One reason for the current crisis, Berensin testified, is the decision DHS made several years ago to “close the front door to shelter” during the seven months outside the official winter season.

This, she said, creates a “pent up demand” by the time the first freezing-cold day arrives. And some families may by then have more severe problems — thus be less likely to rapidly recover their ability to pay for housing, assuming they ever had it.

The strategy also calls for the creation of a new ICH committee to monitor and improve the rapid re-housing process. It’s to be a very hands-on group and to have direct access to Berns when progress hinges on decisions he must make or runs into “roadblocks” he can clear.

Ultimately, however, as the strategy says, the homeless family crisis reflects problems that DHS alone can’t solve, e.g., the acute shortage of housing that’s affordable for the District’s lowest-income residents, the divers disadvantages that keep them near or below the poverty line.

In this respect, the more than 1,000 newly homeless families DHS now projects for this winter season are canaries in the coal mine. The Mayor and his lead officials would do well to recognize this, instead of effectively blaming them for leaving doubled-up situations that they — and/or their hosts — know are untenable.


What We Know (and Don’t) About the Drops in DC Homelessness Rates

May 9, 2013

In my last post, I summarized the major results of the latest point-in-time, i.e., one-night, count of homeless people in the District of Columbia.

We see one-year decreases for the homeless population as a whole and for all the subgroups the District reports to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Decreases are longer-term for two overlapping groups — homeless individual men and women, i.e., those not with family members, and individuals classified as chronically homeless.

The District’s report attempts to account for the decreases. It attributes them to an expansion in permanent supportive housing capacity and its investments in homelessness prevention and rapid re-housing.

We’ve got sound evidence for the impact of PSH. The evidence for HPRP — the rapid re-housing component, in particular — is squishy.

It may help explain the one-year declines, but they’re no proof that rapid re-housing will end homelessness for the families that the Mayor — and his Director of Human Services — want to force into the program.

Permanent Supportive Housing

As I previously remarked, the steady drop in the number of chronically homeless individuals counted probably reflects the high priority that both federal and local policies have placed on moving these individuals into PSH.

The report itself provides additional evidence for this. At the time of the latest count, it says, 3,690 individuals and 983 families were in PSH units, thus not homeless for the purposes of the count.

Both these figures are higher than those reported in 2012 — by 18% and 8% respectively.

But this doesn’t mean that the District can take credit for providing housing with supportive services for all these formerly homeless people.

The DC Fiscal Policy Institute reports that the Department of Human Services expects to have 1,350 households in the PSH units it’s funding this fiscal year.

Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing

The PIT count report offers no basis for assessing the impacts of homelessness prevention and rapid re-housing.

A brief by the Community Partnership to End Homelessness says that 762 individuals and 643 families are “stably housed” because of HPRP.

But we have no timeframe for these figures. So we don’t know how long ago the beneficiaries received the one-shot or limited-time assistance — let alone anything about them, e.g., how much steady income they had.

We do, however, have data indicating that a goodly number of individuals and/or families didn’t stay stably housed after their rapid re-housing subsidies expired, presumably because they couldn’t afford to pay the full rent.

A presentation, also by the Community Partnership, says that two-thirds of rapid re-housing participants “exited” the program to “permanent destinations” (HUD-speak for permanent housing) and that 91% of them remain stably housed.

So about 39 out of every 100 households that had the limited-term rent subsidies are in some sort of unstable situation — either at-risk or literally homeless.

We don’t know how long the rest have been stably housed, though a recent statement by David Berns, the director of Human Services, suggests perhaps only one year.*

We do know, however, that some homeless families declined rapid re-housing because they were pretty sure they couldn’t pick up the full rent. So even if the stably-housed figure is fairly long-term, it would reflect some self-selection.

Why Fuss About the Rapid Re-Housing Data?

I’m nattering about the under-supported claims for the success of rapid re-housing because they have immediate policy implications.

As I recently wrote, the Mayor’s proposed amendments to the Homeless Services Reform Act would, among other things, give homeless families a choice between rapid re-housing and life on the streets.

At the time of the PIT count, 18% of homeless D.C. adults with children had no source of income whatever. Twenty-five percent were employed, but obviously not earning enough to pay market-rate rents here.

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program was the most commonly reported source of income. The maximum TANF benefit for a family of three is less than a third of the monthly rent on a modest two-bedroom apartment.

How many families who’ve remained stably housed entered the rapid re-housing program with comparable incomes — and comparably doubtful near-term prospects for such significant improvement that they could afford full rent?

For the two-bedroom apartment, that would require a monthly income of nearly $4,707 — more than three times the District’s minimum wage.

Seems to me the DC Council should have a much better grasp on the putative — and prospective — success rates of rapid re-housing before it votes on the HRSA amendments.

A better grasp and a lot more input on other issues too.

* Berns says that “91 percent of those who have been re-housed … remained in stable housing after one year.” He’s apparently using the Community Partnership’s figure as if it were a percent of the whole, rather than of two-thirds.


DC Homelessness Rates Trend Downward, But Still Very High

May 8, 2013

The upsurge in homelessness in the District of Columbia seems to have abated — at least for the time being. The actual numbers, however, remain very high.

And while homelessness among individual adults is now lower than in 2008, when the recession had just set in, family homelessness is still exponentially higher.

This is the top line news for the District in the just-issued report on the results of the one-night homelessness counts by communities that belong to the Metropolitan Council of Governments.

As I always say, these point-in-time counts don’t tell us how many homeless people there are — only how many meet the restrictive definition the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development mandates.

Nevertheless, they’re all we’ve got for the District’s homeless population and the subgroups reported to HUD.

So here are the figures, with some additional calculations I’ve made to indicate change over time. I’ll deal with how the report explains the recent decreases in a followup post.

The total number of homeless people counted dropped a bit — from 6,954 last year to 6,865. This represents a decrease of 1.3%, but it’s still 16% higher than in 2008.

The number of homeless families also decreased — from 1,014 to 983 or by 3%. Even with the drop, however, the number has increased by nearly 67.5% since 2008.

The count identified 3,169 homeless family members — just 18 fewer than in 2012. Of these, 1,301 were adults and 1,868 were children with them.

The number of homeless individual men and women, i.e., those not with family members, declined for the third year in a row. The latest count identified 3,696 — 22% fewer than in 2008.

These are adults only. The count identified six homeless unaccompanied youth, i.e., kids under 18 who weren’t with a family member.

This presumably reflects major flaws in the count, since a limited survey by the DC Alliance of Youth Advocates found about six times as many who’d fit the definition the count used.

Both local and federal policies have put a high priority on moving chronically homeless individuals into permanent supportive housing.

We see the results in the number counted — 1,764, as compared to 1,870 in 2012. This is the fourth year in a row that the number has dropped.

PSH probably also helps explain the relatively small number of unsheltered homeless individuals counted — 512. This is 25% fewer than in 2012.

The count isn’t complete, of course, but the percent drop is probably fairly accurate. Figures for earlier years may not be comparable because recent PIT reports suggest greater efforts to identify the unsheltered population.

All these numbers speak to choices local policymakers have made — and some facing them right now. More on this tomorrow.


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