A Better Winter Plan for Homeless DC Families … At Last

September 10, 2015

I’ve remarked before on promising shifts in the District of Columbia’s approach to homelessness generally and to family homelessness in particular. We see them again, I think, in the Winter Plan the DC Interagency Council on Homelessness adopted last Tuesday.

‘Bout time because we’ve witnessed a series of funding cutbacks — and worse — by the past two administrations. Some, though not all surfaced, if you knew what to look for, in the annual plans the ICH developed, as legally required, to lay the groundwork for what the District would do to keep homeless people safe during severely-cold weather.

I’ve been blogging on the plans for six years now — mainly on how they address the District’s legal responsibility to shelter or otherwise protect homeless families from freezing outdoors.

Last year’s plan for families was, in most respects, the worst. An effort initiated the prior year to estimate shelter needs on a month-to-month basis was abandoned — or shared only among the drafters.

No specifics at all for how the District would shelter or house the estimated total number of families who’d be entitled to protection during the five or so months of the winter season.

As I wrote at the time, the ICH basically threw up its hands because the homeless services budget clearly fell short of the resources needed.

The new plan doesn’t — and perhaps couldn’t — specify the number of families that won’t need shelter because help they receive kept them housed or will need it only for a short while because they get subsidized housing of one sort or another.

It does, however, make a serious effort to project shelter needs for each winter month — a more sophisticated projection than the plan for 2013-14 disclosed.

We see, on the one hand, the number of families that will qualify for shelter and, on the other hand, the number that will “exit” — not only those who’ll leave because they find some alternative, as before, but also those who receive assistance.

This may sound like a technical matter, but it isn’t because the estimates provide the basis for monitoring the in-and-out flow — and thus for action, if needed, to avert another crisis. The plan, in fact, commits the District to updating the figures.

Three other changes reflect policy shifts — all embedded in the estimates. One is the Bowser administration’s decision to shelter homeless families who’ve got no safe place to stay year round, rather than let them in only when the law says it must.

This is something that advocates have urged, for both humane and practical reasons, ever since the Department of Human Services, under the Gray administration, abandoned an unofficial, but operative year-round shelter policy dating back to some time before the Homeless Services Reform Act established a right to shelter.

The humane aspect needs no explanation. The practical, however, perhaps does. Basically, the intake center was overwhelmed with homeless families on the first freezing-cold day — and DC General, the main homeless family shelter, immediately full, if it wasn’t already.

This is one, though not the only reason that DHS had to scramble to find a place to park homeless families. Also why intake center staff may not have done the best job with needs assessments and referrals, the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless has suggested.

The two other changes reflect a budget that realistically anticipates the need to shelter more families than DC General can accommodate.

Would seem like a no-brainer, one might think. But the last Gray administration budget included no funds for motel rooms, even though it also left roughly 90 DC General units unfunded. This, more than anything else, accounts for the no-plan Winter Plan for homeless families last year.

Now we have not only projections for “overflow units needed,” but a subset for “contingency capacity.” This, I’m told, provides for an extra number of motel rooms DHS will contract for to ensure swift, adequate shelter if the entry estimates prove too low or the exit estimates too high.

The numbers can, of course, be adjusted as the season goes on. But the very fact that the plan expressly includes a fudge factor indicates that DHS has both the will and some confidence in resources to agree to a crisis prevention measure.

Here again, I’m struck by the difference that the Mayor has made by her choice of a new director and inferentially her commitment to support. Looking back even before the later days of the Gray administration, we see instead empty assurances that DHS will somehow muddle through.

Finally, I’d be remiss if I didn’t note that the DC Council also deserves credit for policies and plans that promise more enlightened, effective services for both homeless families and singles.

The ICH has long had members with the expertise and commitment to propose such policies and plans. But the Council’s decision to create what became a funded executive director position for the ICH has clearly made a difference.

I’ve already commented on the thoughtful, ambitious plan the ICH developed to make homelessness in the District “rare, brief, and non-recurring.” The budget for the upcoming fiscal year shows that the Mayor intends to jump start action on the plan.

So we’ve got grounds to hope for more effective homeless services, better tuned to the diverse needs of homeless and at-risk residents — a prospectively fewer of them, though that hinges on developments beyond the reach of DHS.

I feel similarly hopeful about the new Winter Plan — and for similar reasons.  As I learned early on, non-agency members of the ICH working group that develops the annual plans may propose, but it’s DHS that disposes so far as resources are concerned.

Not saying everything will fall nicely into place now. But the Winter Plan, so far as it goes, does seem to  reflect the “fresh start for homeless families” that the Mayor promised the ICH last Tuesday.

NOTE: Not everything the Mayor told the ICH merits as much confidence. I’ll probably have more to say about her legislative plans when I’ve got a clearer fix on them.

Housing Vouchers Best Solution for Family Homelessness

July 30, 2015

Here in the District of Columbia — and elsewhere — we’ve had a lot of back-and-forth on rapid re-housing as a tool for ending homelessness. No one doubts that it ends homelessness for awhile, since participants get a short-term subsidy to help cover rent.

The issue is rather whether they can get their act together to the point they can pay full rent when their subsidies expire — generally, at the end of a year, though in some communities up to 18 months.

A study for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development suggests families often can’t — at least, not for very long.

The study was one of those controlled experiments. Researchers gave homeless families in twelve communities one of three types of housing assistance that moved them out of shelters. A fourth group got only the “usual care” the community offered, e.g., more time in the shelter, some supportive services.

Which form of assistance families got, if any had nothing to do with their past history or other characteristics that could affect their near-term prospects, e.g., parental employment, health.

The researchers then looked at how they were faring a year and a half later. Forty-seven percent of the rapidly re-housed reported they’d recently been homeless or living doubled up with friends or family members because they couldn’t afford rent on their own.

This is statistically no different from what families who’d gotten no housing aid reported. By contrast, only 22% of families who’d gotten regular indefinite-term housing vouchers had again been without a home of their own.

So in the simplest sense, the study, which is still ongoing, confirms what most advocates have long said. The best solution for family homelessness is affordable housing. Most wouldn’t be homeless if they just had enough help to pay rent.

Families may also benefit from services, but they generally don’t need what the researchers term “specialized homeless-specific psychosocial services” — an underlying assumption of at least some “usual care” and transitional housing programs.

The study, however, tells us more than this. Families secure in their housing because their vouchers didn’t have fixed end dates fared better on a range of well-being measures.

For example:

  • Fewer children in the securely-housed families had been placed in foster care or sent to live with a relative.
  • Fewer parents reported psychological distress or showed measurable signs of substance abuse.
  • Half as many experienced violence by an “intimate partner,” presumably what most of us refer to as domestic violence.
  • Fewer families suffered from food insecurity, i.e., couldn’t always afford enough for everyone to eat enough (or perhaps anything).

Turning — as of course, one must — to cost issues, we learn that housing vouchers were cheaper than either rapid re-housing or transitional housing.

These are direct costs only. Families with housing vouchers cost, on average, a tad more than those in rapid re-housing once the services they received because they sought them out are factored in — roughly $136.50 more per month.

Emergency shelter, plus “usual care” services cost far more. And interestingly, the services accounted for 63% of the total. Not a great ROI on that investment, it seems.

The president of the National Alliance to End Homelessness says it’s misleading to compare voucher costs to those of “crisis interventions.” This seems reasonable on its face because voucher costs were — and will be — ongoing.

And it’s just the sort of thing one would expect from the head of an organization that’s heavily invested in promoting rapid re-housing. But rapid re-housing has been sold as an effective strategy for ending homelessness, not a short-term solution, as she now says.

Followers may recall questions I raised about the rapid re-housing success rate that the District’s prime homeless services contractor reported — and the former head of the Department of Human Services cited.

That rate reflected only the percent of rapidly re-housed families that hadn’t again sought shelter through the District’s intake system, as Marta Berensin and other attorneys at the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless have noted.

Most other reported success rates have a similar limit.

Things look quite different when we factor in families who started couch-surfing when their short-term housing subsidies expired — and others who became homeless, but didn’t return to the “system” that had failed to solve their problem before.

The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness and the District’s local equivalent envision a time when homelessness will be “rare, brief and non-recurring.” For some families, rapid re-housing may, by this definition, end homelessness.

But for most, subsidies that make housing affordable for the long term seem the answer — at least, among the options the HUD study assessed. Other measures to rebuild and preserve the dwindling stock of affordable housing belong in the mix too.

Because high housing costs, plus low wages and even lower publicly-funded benefits are the main problem, not personal “psychosocial” problems that need fixing.

What DC Could Do About the Homeless Family Crisis

February 12, 2014

As I said a couple of days ago, the District’s homeless family crisis has reached an unprecedented — and unforeseen — level. At the end of last month, the Department of Human Services was already sheltering about 100 more newly homeless families than were projected for the entire winter season.

DHS Director David Berns seems resigned to some sort of cataclysm. “I don’t see how we can continue at this rate,” he said during the recent hearing on the crisis — but also that he didn’t have “any fresh ideas.”

Some movers and shakers on the Interagency Council on Homelessness do have fresh ideas — mainly for how DHS could do what it’s been trying to do better. They’ve produced a multi-part strategy to address the crisis. It also identifies issues that must be swiftly resolved to prevent a recurrence.

The first part consists of immediate measures to speed up the rapid re-housing placement rate, e.g., more staff and other resources to identify and inspect affordable units, perhaps some sort of incentive for landlords so they’ll rent to families with short-term, iffy housing subsidies.

A second part identifies existing homelessness prevention and subsidized housing programs that should receive more funding so as to open up space in the DC General shelter for homeless families and thus reduce — or altogether eliminate — the use of hotels as a fallback.

Roughly 80% of the families would receive rapid re-housing subsidies, plus “help in identifying a longer-term affordable unit” and services “related to housing stability” and employment.

Permanent supportive housing would be made available to about 10%. The remaining 10% or so would receive emergency rental assistance, i.e., one-time help with a security deposit and first month’s rent, plus again help finding an affordable unit.

The percent allocations are based on results of assessments that two of the service providers have been conducting, using a research-based tool designed to match homeless families to the most appropriate types of aid.

Only 15% of the families thus far assessed have sought homeless services in the District again after a term in rapid re-housing, according to testimony by the Community of Hope’s Executive Director Kelly Sweeney McShane.

The Transitional Housing Corporation, which is also using the tool for assessments, has posted similar results for its rapid re-housing program.

I still can’t help wondering how a much larger number of homeless families will manage to pick up the rent — and keep paying it — or find a longer-term affordable unit when their subsidies expire, even if someone’s scouting the market for them.

So it’s good to note that the strategy also calls for a “community conversation” about the Local Rent Supplement Program, i.e., the District’s own version of federally-funded housing vouchers.

As Marta Berensin at the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless observed in her testimony, the District has, for some years, ignored the recommendations of the original Comprehensive Housing Strategy Task Force.

These included 14,600 locally-funded housing vouchers by the beginning of the next decade. The current budget will support about 2,730.

We know the Gray administration doesn’t like these vouchers — at least, not those that enable low-income residents to pay market-rate rents. And both Berns and at least some members of the strategy-development group worry that homeless families will hunker down in shelter if they think they’ll eventually get one.

But if we really want to solve the homeless family crisis, I think the so-called tenant-based vouchers have to be part of the toolbox too. The strategy drafters may agree, since they acknowledge the need for vouchers and other “affordable housing supports.”

We’re also to engage in conversation about other matters, including a return to year round services for homeless families. This is now being framed as a preventive strategy, though basic human decency alone could justify it.

One reason for the current crisis, Berensin testified, is the decision DHS made several years ago to “close the front door to shelter” during the seven months outside the official winter season.

This, she said, creates a “pent up demand” by the time the first freezing-cold day arrives. And some families may by then have more severe problems — thus be less likely to rapidly recover their ability to pay for housing, assuming they ever had it.

The strategy also calls for the creation of a new ICH committee to monitor and improve the rapid re-housing process. It’s to be a very hands-on group and to have direct access to Berns when progress hinges on decisions he must make or runs into “roadblocks” he can clear.

Ultimately, however, as the strategy says, the homeless family crisis reflects problems that DHS alone can’t solve, e.g., the acute shortage of housing that’s affordable for the District’s lowest-income residents, the divers disadvantages that keep them near or below the poverty line.

In this respect, the more than 1,000 newly homeless families DHS now projects for this winter season are canaries in the coal mine. The Mayor and his lead officials would do well to recognize this, instead of effectively blaming them for leaving doubled-up situations that they — and/or their hosts — know are untenable.

What We Know (and Don’t) About the Drops in DC Homelessness Rates

May 9, 2013

In my last post, I summarized the major results of the latest point-in-time, i.e., one-night, count of homeless people in the District of Columbia.

We see one-year decreases for the homeless population as a whole and for all the subgroups the District reports to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Decreases are longer-term for two overlapping groups — homeless individual men and women, i.e., those not with family members, and individuals classified as chronically homeless.

The District’s report attempts to account for the decreases. It attributes them to an expansion in permanent supportive housing capacity and its investments in homelessness prevention and rapid re-housing.

We’ve got sound evidence for the impact of PSH. The evidence for HPRP — the rapid re-housing component, in particular — is squishy.

It may help explain the one-year declines, but they’re no proof that rapid re-housing will end homelessness for the families that the Mayor — and his Director of Human Services — want to force into the program.

Permanent Supportive Housing

As I previously remarked, the steady drop in the number of chronically homeless individuals counted probably reflects the high priority that both federal and local policies have placed on moving these individuals into PSH.

The report itself provides additional evidence for this. At the time of the latest count, it says, 3,690 individuals and 983 families were in PSH units, thus not homeless for the purposes of the count.

Both these figures are higher than those reported in 2012 — by 18% and 8% respectively.

But this doesn’t mean that the District can take credit for providing housing with supportive services for all these formerly homeless people.

The DC Fiscal Policy Institute reports that the Department of Human Services expects to have 1,350 households in the PSH units it’s funding this fiscal year.

Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing

The PIT count report offers no basis for assessing the impacts of homelessness prevention and rapid re-housing.

A brief by the Community Partnership to End Homelessness says that 762 individuals and 643 families are “stably housed” because of HPRP.

But we have no timeframe for these figures. So we don’t know how long ago the beneficiaries received the one-shot or limited-time assistance — let alone anything about them, e.g., how much steady income they had.

We do, however, have data indicating that a goodly number of individuals and/or families didn’t stay stably housed after their rapid re-housing subsidies expired, presumably because they couldn’t afford to pay the full rent.

A presentation, also by the Community Partnership, says that two-thirds of rapid re-housing participants “exited” the program to “permanent destinations” (HUD-speak for permanent housing) and that 91% of them remain stably housed.

So about 39 out of every 100 households that had the limited-term rent subsidies are in some sort of unstable situation — either at-risk or literally homeless.

We don’t know how long the rest have been stably housed, though a recent statement by David Berns, the director of Human Services, suggests perhaps only one year.*

We do know, however, that some homeless families declined rapid re-housing because they were pretty sure they couldn’t pick up the full rent. So even if the stably-housed figure is fairly long-term, it would reflect some self-selection.

Why Fuss About the Rapid Re-Housing Data?

I’m nattering about the under-supported claims for the success of rapid re-housing because they have immediate policy implications.

As I recently wrote, the Mayor’s proposed amendments to the Homeless Services Reform Act would, among other things, give homeless families a choice between rapid re-housing and life on the streets.

At the time of the PIT count, 18% of homeless D.C. adults with children had no source of income whatever. Twenty-five percent were employed, but obviously not earning enough to pay market-rate rents here.

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program was the most commonly reported source of income. The maximum TANF benefit for a family of three is less than a third of the monthly rent on a modest two-bedroom apartment.

How many families who’ve remained stably housed entered the rapid re-housing program with comparable incomes — and comparably doubtful near-term prospects for such significant improvement that they could afford full rent?

For the two-bedroom apartment, that would require a monthly income of nearly $4,707 — more than three times the District’s minimum wage.

Seems to me the DC Council should have a much better grasp on the putative — and prospective — success rates of rapid re-housing before it votes on the HRSA amendments.

A better grasp and a lot more input on other issues too.

* Berns says that “91 percent of those who have been re-housed … remained in stable housing after one year.” He’s apparently using the Community Partnership’s figure as if it were a percent of the whole, rather than of two-thirds.

DC Homelessness Rates Trend Downward, But Still Very High

May 8, 2013

The upsurge in homelessness in the District of Columbia seems to have abated — at least for the time being. The actual numbers, however, remain very high.

And while homelessness among individual adults is now lower than in 2008, when the recession had just set in, family homelessness is still exponentially higher.

This is the top line news for the District in the just-issued report on the results of the one-night homelessness counts by communities that belong to the Metropolitan Council of Governments.

As I always say, these point-in-time counts don’t tell us how many homeless people there are — only how many meet the restrictive definition the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development mandates.

Nevertheless, they’re all we’ve got for the District’s homeless population and the subgroups reported to HUD.

So here are the figures, with some additional calculations I’ve made to indicate change over time. I’ll deal with how the report explains the recent decreases in a followup post.

The total number of homeless people counted dropped a bit — from 6,954 last year to 6,865. This represents a decrease of 1.3%, but it’s still 16% higher than in 2008.

The number of homeless families also decreased — from 1,014 to 983 or by 3%. Even with the drop, however, the number has increased by nearly 67.5% since 2008.

The count identified 3,169 homeless family members — just 18 fewer than in 2012. Of these, 1,301 were adults and 1,868 were children with them.

The number of homeless individual men and women, i.e., those not with family members, declined for the third year in a row. The latest count identified 3,696 — 22% fewer than in 2008.

These are adults only. The count identified six homeless unaccompanied youth, i.e., kids under 18 who weren’t with a family member.

This presumably reflects major flaws in the count, since a limited survey by the DC Alliance of Youth Advocates found about six times as many who’d fit the definition the count used.

Both local and federal policies have put a high priority on moving chronically homeless individuals into permanent supportive housing.

We see the results in the number counted — 1,764, as compared to 1,870 in 2012. This is the fourth year in a row that the number has dropped.

PSH probably also helps explain the relatively small number of unsheltered homeless individuals counted — 512. This is 25% fewer than in 2012.

The count isn’t complete, of course, but the percent drop is probably fairly accurate. Figures for earlier years may not be comparable because recent PIT reports suggest greater efforts to identify the unsheltered population.

All these numbers speak to choices local policymakers have made — and some facing them right now. More on this tomorrow.

DC Child Welfare Agency Will Treat “Traumas” of Child Poverty

November 19, 2012

Policy consultant and blogger Susie Cambria calls our attention to a grant the District of Columbia’s Child and Family Services Agency recently received.

The grant, says CFSA, will help it “make trauma-informed treatment the foundation of serving children and youth in the District [sic] child welfare system.”

The approach sounds like a good thing, but it’s far beyond my capacity to assess.

The reason I write about it is rather what Mindy Good, CFSA’s public information officer, told Cambria about the traumatic events children have experienced by the time they become part of the agency’s caseload.

Some are cases we could confidently classify as abuse, e.g., severe physical punishment, molesting.

Others bespeak neglect that could call for at least a temporary rescue, e.g., having to rely on a parent or other caretaker whose behavior is “erratic” due to substance abuse or untreated mental illness.

But many are simply consequences of living in a family that’s desperately poor, e.g., “not knowing where the next meal is coming from,” “being homeless or moving a great deal.”

Good alludes to getting the child to safety as a first step. This seems to mean, in most cases, removing children from their parents or other caretakers — itself a traumatic experience, as she notes.

Perhaps even the first traumatic experience they have. It’s by no means clear, for example, that the mere fact of living doubled up with first one family and then another induces emotional and/or behavioral problems.

Last year, CFSA confirmed about 873 cases of child neglect — 58% of all the incidents it substantiated. In 2010, neglect (unspecified) was the primary reason it put 395 children into foster care.

One can’t help wondering how many of them weren’t really neglected at all — children in food insecure families, for example, or in homeless families the District wouldn’t shelter.

Or children being cared for by strangers or tasked with caring for younger sibs — two other “traumatic events” Good cites.

There’s a ready remedy for these “traumas.” And it’s not being put into foster care.

If children justifiably fear hunger, their parents or guardians obviously need food stamps — or if they’re not eligible, assurance that their children often are.

Perhaps they also need cash assistance, since we know that food stamps often don’t cover the costs of even the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s cheapest meal plan.

If children are homeless, their families need affordable housing. Same if the family moves frequently because it has to rely on the hospitality of friends and relatives.

If children get parked with strangers or have to shoulder inappropriate child care responsibilities, perhaps the family needs a voucher to pay for daycare — and access to a provider who’ll care for kids early, late and on unpredicable schedules.

CFSA can advise families how to seek these kinds of help. And it may now be doing so, since it reports a new response model, which, in some cases, “leads to service options the family can choose to accept.”

But, of course, seeking isn’t receiving.

As recently as 2010, CFSA cited “inadequate housing” as the primary reason it put some children into foster care. Telling their parents they could apply for housing assistance would be futile, since they’d merely join the many thousands of households on the waiting list.

Though parents might enroll in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Family’s program, the cash benefits would leave them in dire poverty — perhaps still unable to stretch their food budgets till the end of the month.

They’d be eligible for child care assistance, but they might not be able to find it because the District’s provider reimbursement rates have led to a severe shortage of available slots, especially for very young children and those with disabilities.

CFSA’s new treatment approach may help children overcome whatever traumas they’ve experienced because their parents can’t afford to provide them with safe, stable housing, regular meals and the like. But it’s a second-best solution.

Perhaps the best CFSA can do, however, because our system defines “child welfare” as protection from abuse and neglect.

It’s up to other agencies — and ultimately to our elected officials — to ensure that the poor children in our community have what they need to fare well.

Or rather, it’s ultimately up to us since we’re the ones who elected them. Don’t think as many of us as could are doing as much as we might, though some are giving their all and more.

DC Family Homelessness Hits New High

May 10, 2012

Every year, as some of you know, the District of Columbia participates in a regional one-night count of homeless people within its boundaries.

Technically known as a point-in-time count, it doesn’t begin to tell us how many homeless people there are — only how many the counters find who meet the restrictive definition the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development mandates.

Now we have the results of the January 2012 point-in-time counts. For the District, there should be no big surprises. Some shockers maybe, but not surprises.

The total number of homeless people counted increased again — 6,954, as compared to 6,546 in 2011.

The increase was driven entirely by a further rise in the number who were in families.

The count identified a total of 3,187 homeless family members — 499 more than in 2011. Of these 1,307 were adults and 1,880 were children.

The number of homeless adult family members is 239 higher than in 2011. The number of homeless children with them is 260 higher — an increase of 16% in just one year.

These numbers have increased steadily ever since the recession began. The latest total of literally homeless family members is 73.6% higher than in 2008.

Not surprisingly then, the number of homeless families increased as well — from 858 in 2011 to 1,014 this year. The count has increased by 72.7% since 2008.

Over the years, the number of homeless individual men and women, i.e., those not with family members, has fluctuated.

This year, 3,754 were counted — 104 fewer than in 2011. The latest number represents a 10.8% decrease since 2008. More evidence of how our homeless population is changing — and our policies lagging behind.

One would hope that the new PIT count would persuade the DC Council that $7 million less for homeless services will exacerbate the crisis already overwhelming the Department of Human Services’ capacities to protect homeless families.

It’s got about 200 of them parked in costly motel rooms because there’s no room for any more at DC General, the main publicly-funded shelter for families.

And there’s no clear exit for these families because the District hasn’t invested enough in housing vouchers or other affordable housing programs.

All DHS feels it can do is turn away all newly-homeless families until next winter begins — even those who’ve got no place to stay.

That, however, apparently won’t be enough to make up for the homeless services funding loss.

The DC Fiscal Policy Institute reports that DHS plans to stop serving lunches at DC General. But parents can’t cook there or keep perishables cold. Cost and health problems in the forecast.

Homeless parents not enrolled in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program wouldn’t get job training any more — this although only 17% of D.C. adults in families had a job of any sort in January.

Apparently there’d be a cutback in medical services as well.

It’s not only homeless families who’d be affected. For the first time, to my knowledge, DHS would regress toward its minimum legal obligations to protect individual homeless men and women, as it already has with homeless families.

Shelter capacity for individuals would be cut in half during the seven months outside the official winter season. This incidentally would also deprive them of the meals shelters serve.

They’d get no transportation to shelters that had space, though the largest for men are quite remote.

And maybe there’d be less demand — though not less need — since DHS would also eliminate outreach to homeless people sleeping on the streets and other “places not meant for human habitation,” as HUD terms them.

Barring unforeseeable good fortunes, some 1,870 homeless men and women could have no safe place to sleep come next April — and nothing to eat unless they could pay for it or find charitable folks who would.

The District counts homeless people every year. But do the homeless people count?

Apparently not enough to the Gray administration. But to the Council?

Maybe if those of you who live in the District put some pressure on. The Fair Budget Coalition has an editable e-mail message you can use.

UPDATE: I’ve just learned that families who’d been placed at the Comfort Inn have been moved. I’m told that 150 is a better estimate of homeless families in motel rooms now.


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