We Need More Than Just More Jobs

August 28, 2012

“Poverty in America: Why can’t we end it?” Professor Peter Edelman asks. Or maybe the New York Times headline writer asks, since Edelman proceeds to tell us that we can — and how.

Top of the to-do list is to create more jobs that pay decent wages.

Well, how do we do that?

We need a full employment policy, Edelman says. This, I take it, means both public investments and diverse fiscal and labor policy changes that would achieve — and then sustain — a negligible unemployment rate.

We’d have more jobs, but also a relatively small pool of jobless job seekers. Employers would thus have to offer decent wages if they wanted to hire people qualified for the jobs they needed to fill.

Professor Robert Pollin, author of the new Back to Full Employment, says this happened in the 1960s and again in the late 1990s, especially for people “at the low end of the labor market.”

Progressives, Edeleman among them, also call for larger investments in education and skill-development.

Not the answer, according to an analysis by the Center for Economic and Policy Research.

We’ve already got a higher percent of college graduates in the workforce than we did at the end of the 1970s. Yet the share of good jobs, as CEPR defines them,* is smaller — and was even before the recession set in.

The problem, it says, isn’t that workers’ skills haven’t kept up with the pace of technological change — though many allege a “skills mismatch” as the source of our persistently high unemployment rate.

It’s that workers have lost their bargaining power, especially those at the middle of the income scale and below.

Diverse changes in the labor market are responsible for this, e.g., jobs outsourced from the public sector and from local manufacturing to cheap labor markets overseas, a “dysfunctional immigration system” that depresses both wages and other aspects of job quality.

For these and a variety of other reasons, many of the top-growing occupations are in service areas where wages are characteristically low — retail sales, home care, food preparation and other restaurant work, etc.

These jobs obviously can’t be exported. Nor can the people who do them be replaced by machines.

But barring policy changes, they’ll still be low-wage jobs with few or no benefits.

I’m all for improving our public education system and for making it possible for low-income people to go to college — and graduate. We’ve got a long way to go.

But if every working-wage person in the country had a college degree, we’d just have even more college graduates doing work well below their competencies — and effectively pushing out people whose skills match the job requirements.

So we obviously need more good jobs for these current and future college graduates.

But if we’re going to end poverty, we need to make those low-paying service and other proliferating bottom-of-the-barrel jobs better too.

I’ll have more to say about this. In the meantime, Happy Labor Day to you all.

* A “good job” pays at least $18.50 an hour — the 1979 inflation-adjusted median for men. It also offers employer-subsidized¬† health insurance and an employer-sponsored retirement plan. CEPR considers other aspects of job quality important, e.g., paid sick leave, but couldn’t get reliable data to measure changes since the end of the 70s.

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Widely-Reported Flat Poverty Rate May Be Deceptive

February 17, 2011

A New York Times editorial cites one of the Census Bureau’s alternative poverty estimates as evidence that “the safety net, fortified by stimulus” kept the number of people in poverty from rising in 2009.

For this, it relies on an analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities — the same one I used to arrive at a similar, though more cautious conclusion.

“Sorry,” says Shawn Fremstad, Director of the Inclusive and Sustainable Economy Initiative at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. “Poverty really did increase in 2009.”

True, the expanded food stamp benefits and tax credits that were part of the economic recovery act may have kept poverty from increasing as much as it would have otherwise. But they didn’t offset the impacts of massive job losses and related losses of health insurance.

According to Fremstad, the alternative poverty rate didn’t go up in part because the alternative poverty threshold that produced the no-increase result went down. This, he says, was also true for the threshold used to produce the official poverty rate, but the decline was smaller — slightly over a third of a percent, as compared to 1%.

The gap reflects differences in the data sets Census uses to establish the thresholds.

As I’ve written before, the official threshold is set at three times the early 1960’s cost of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economy Food Plan, adjusted for inflation. The alternative threshold at issue is instead tied to the amount that moderate-income households spend on housing, utilities and food.

When the housing market tanks, as it certainly has, the alternative threshold won’t keep up with the overall inflation rate — even actually decline, as it did in 2009. This could boost some people above the cut-off, though they were as income-poor as those who fell below it were in 2008.

But if their housing costs were actually lower, wouldn’t their resources come closer to covering their basic needs? For the purposes of the poverty measure, that depends on what counts as a basic need.

Which brings us to Fremstad’s second point. The no-increase alternative measure doesn’t fully account for medical costs. Instead, it adjusts only for out-of-pocket medical expenditures, e.g., deductibles and co-pays.

Sounds reasonable enough until you consider what can happen when people lose health insurance, as 4.4 million did in 2009.

Some will be well enough off to pay for essential health care costs, notwithstanding the bigger drain on their resources.They’ll seem to be poorer because the measure picks up their costs.¬† Others will forgo care. They’ll seem to be relatively better off, though they could well be poorer than those who continue to pay for care.

Fremstad says the Census Bureau actually did publish some alternative poverty measures that include medical expenses, rather than just out-of-pockets. These produced higher thresholds than in 2008 and somewhere between 1.1 million and 1.8 million more people in poverty.

Still less than the 3.74 million in the official estimate, but enough to suggest that the poverty rate didn’t stay flat — if the test is whether people could afford essential expenditures.

Lastly, Fremstad notes that the Census Bureau counted the full value of refundable tax credits as 2009 income, even though “nearly all” the families who gained from the expanded Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit got their benefits as a lump sum in 2010, i.e., after they filed their 2009 tax returns.

So they were no less poor in 2009 than they would have been with no refunds at all.

None of this is to say that CBPP erred in finding that major safety net programs, including the expansions effected by the recovery act, kept some millions of people out of poverty. Nor that the Times is wrong in saying that Congress should “take a good look at those numbers … before it commits to any more slashing and burning.”

But it does, I think, show how urgently we need a single, reliable poverty measure to tell us how many poor people there are — and who they are — at any given time and over time.

As the Times editorial indicates, this is not just of interest to economists and others of a wonkish bent. It’s got real world consequences for policymaking and for a still-unknown number of poor people affected by the policies made.